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Abstract
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Acquisition of the Mental Lexicon, IRCS, University of Pennsylvania, January 1992. It argues in support of
using statistical techniques like Brent's to minimize the consequences of errors and misanalyses, but
concludes that the case for believing that children acquire subcategorizations and other aspects of
syntax on the basis of semantic and contextual cues remains strong.
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The paper was delivered as a commentary upon Michael Brent's
presentation "Acquisition of Subcategorization Frames Using Aggregated Evidence from Local Syntactic Cues" to the Penn Language Acquisition Conference, IRCS, University of Pennsylvania,
1992. It argues in support of using statistical techniques like
Brent's to minimise the consequences of errors and misanalyses,
but concludes that the case for believing that children acquire
subcategorisations and other aspects of syntax on the basis of
semantic and contextual cues rema,ins strong.
The question of how children acquire lexical entries for verbs, and in particular their subcategorisation frames is one of the central questions concerning
the child's acquisition of syntax. Its importance is enhanced by the recent
tendency in theories of grammar to gravitate to a lexicalist position, and the
role of verbs as the head of their clause. How do children do it, given the
non-determinacy and automata-theoretic complexity of the syntax itself, and
the unsystematic presentation and error-proneness of the linguistic data that
*Thanks t o Lila Gleitman and Jeff Siskind for reading the draft. The research was
supported in part by NSF grant nos. IRI90-18513, IRI90-16592, and CISE IIP, CDA
88-22719, DARPA grant no. N00014-90-J-1863, and ARO grant no. DAAL03-89-C0031.

they apparently have to make do with? Michael Brent's paper in this volume
shows how the statistical technique of binomial error estimation can be used
to minimise the effect of contamination in the data available to the child
language learner, arising either from errors in the input itself or errors in the
child's analyses of the input sentences. The technique is demonstrated by
applying it to the sentences of a corpus of actual adult-child conversations,
to derive subcategorisation frames for verbs from analyses based on imperfectly reliable local syntactic cues defined in terms of sequences of inflectional
morphemes, function words and lexical NPs. As Brent points out, these two
aspects of the work are quite independent: binomial error estimation could
be used to minimise the influence of errors arising from imperfect analysis
procedures of any kind at all, including those based on semantic and prosodic
information, as well as syntactic. The present paper considers the part that
all of these sources of information may play.

The specific application of this technique to low-level syntactic cues, rather
than these richer sources of information, in this and the related work in
Brent's 1991 thesis can be argued to deliver two further important results.
First, it demonstrates a practical technique that actually can be used to automatically build lexicons on the basis of large volumes of text. Although
this point is not discussed in Brent's present paper, it is worth emphasising.
Hand-built dictionaries are inevitably very incomplete with respect to the
exhaustive listing of subcategorisation properties that are needed for many
computational applications. Techniques ba,sed on simplified syntactic properties which probablistically "compile out" syntactic and semantic properties
of what a linguist would regard as "the grammar", and working on the basis of statistical properties of their distribution over a large corpus may well
represent the only practicable possibility for automatically extending such
dictionaries. Full-blown deterministic parsing of the corpora of the requisite
size using linguistically respectable grammars and/or semantic interpretations and deterministic parsing, is impracticably expensive computationally,
using existing techniques, to the extent that it is possible at all.
Second, the present study demonstrates the important fact that the information needed to determine verb subcategorisations actually is there in the

distribution of these very low-level properties in input of the kind that children are actually exposed to. For example, one of the apparent problems for
acquisition of subcategorisation frames on the basis of syntactic information
alone is the systematic ambiguity in all languages between subcategorised
arguments and nonsubcategorised adjuncts, illustrated for English by the
following pair of sentences:
(1) a. We put Harry on the bus
b. We met Harry on the bus
How can the child avoid erroneously subcategorising meet like put? Brent
points out that it doesn't matter if they do, because it is (presumably universally) the case that the relative frequency with which the sequence V NP PP,,
occurs will be significantly higher for verbs like put that subcategorise for NPs
and on P P s than for those like meet which subcategorise for NP and only
allow P P as an adjunct. Binomial error estima,tion is able t o distinguish the
two distributions, and reject the childs spurious evidence from analyses suggesting that meet subcategorises for the PP. Similar results seem t o follow
for spurious occurences of subcategorisations arising from extraction, as in
who did you put on the bus, which might appear otherwise to suggest that
put might subcategorise for PP alone.

It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the child language learner actually makes use of such purely syntactic cues to learn the lexical categories of
verbs. Here Brent is extremely cautious, and goes out of his way to acknowledge the possible involvement of prosodic and semantic cues as well. He notes
in passing that there are a number of open questions that need answering before we can be quite comfortable with the assumption that the child is using
the closed-class cues. The most important is that both the function words
themselves and the cue sequences based on them are language-specific. The
question arises of how the child can possibly catch on to the fact that it, that
and the are cue words, much less that that the sequence V it the suggests
that Vis probably a ditransitive verb, while the sequence V that the suggests
that V is probably a complement verb. It is hard to see that there is any
alternative to knowing, besides the set of possible subcategorisation frames,
a) the precise syntactic significance of each closed class word as NP, Spec of
CP, etc., and b) some statistics about possible corpora, including facts such

as that complement-taking verbs are more common than ditransitives.'

I shall remain equally cautious in the face of such open questions, and
certainly would not wish to claim that the child cannot be using such cues.
However, as long as these questions remain open, it also remains unclear
whether we have escaped what Brent identifies as the "chicken-or-egg problem" of apparently needing to know some syntax to apply this procedure.
This suggests that there may be some point to asking ourselves what other
resources the child could call upon, and in particular whether the two alternatives that Brent mentions, prosody and semantics, can help a child learn
the first elements of syntax, including their first subcategorisations, in the
face of the kind of uncertainties in the input which he identifies.

Although Brent shows how misanalyses arising from the argument/adjunct
ambiguity can be overcome, the consequences of some other quite similar
sorts of ambiguity, such as that between prepositions and particles illustrated
below, are not so easily eliminable by distribution-based methods, since verbs
subcategorise for ambiguous items like up in both its guises:'
(2)

a. We rang up t h e girl
b. We ran up t h e hill

In the case of particles and prepositions it seems intuitively highly likely
that prosody disambiguates the two. Lederer and Kelly 1992 have shown that
adults can reliably identify which of the two a speaker has uttered. They have
shown similar effects for the argument/adjunct alternation. Kelly (1992 and
this volume) presents results which suggest that a number of further apparent
'It is not enough t o assume that the child simply looks out for verbs followed by all
possible sequences of cue words, classifying verbs as "it-tthe verbs", "that+the verbs", etc.
Such a classification does not determine a subcategorisation.
'Brent suggests that spurious analyses of verbs like ring as subcategorising for PP can
be eliminated by observing sets of subcategorisations, presumably meaning that we can
reclassify verbs that have been assigned subcategorisations of both PP and NP+P. However, this is a distinct (and language-specific) complication to the proposal, and appears
likely t o conflict with the other uses that have been proposed for such sets. The prosodic
cues discussed below would allow this particular complication t o be eliminated from his
account.

ambiguities are also correlated with prosodic distinctions. It is true that none
of these prosodic discriminators are invariably present. Nor does it seem at all
likely that all the relevant ambiguities are marked in this way. For example,
I know of no evidence that the V-PP sequence arising from extraction in a,
below, differs in any prosodic repect from that in b:

(3) a. W h o did y o u put on the bus
b. Who did you run up the hill w i t h
However, where the information is marked, it may well be reliable enough
to be used as evidence under appropriate distribution-based techniques such
as Brent's own, especially when we recall that adult's speech to children is
characterised by exaggeration of normal intonation contours.
However, a word of caution is in order here. Adults speakers do not
actually use intonation to indicate syntactic structure, but to convey the
distinctions of discourse meaning that are variously described in terms of
"focus", or of oppositions such as "topic/comment" , "given/newV and the
like. While the elements that are marked in this way correlate with syntactic
structure, this is for semantic reasons, rather than for ease of processing.
When adults exaggerate intonation contours in speaking to children, it is
extremely unlikely that that they are using the intonational markers in any
very different way. It is therefore quite possible that children are using this
information as a semantic, rather than syntactic, cue, aa part of the third
strategy under consideration here.

As soon as it was appreciated that even quite trivial classes of grammar cannot be learned by mere exposure to their stringsets, and that there appears
to be little evidence that any more explicit guidance is provided by adults,
it was obvious that some other source of information, "innate" in the sense
that it is available to the child prelinguistica,lly, must guide them in acquiring
their grammar. As has often been pointed out, the only likely candidate is
However
semantic interpretation or the related conceptual repre~entation.~
31n the context of modern linguistics, the suggest'ion goes hack a t least t o Chomsky
1965, pp.56-59 and Miller 1967. But of course it is a ~nucliolder idea. See Pinker 1979 for

inadequate our formal (and even informal) grasp on the child's prelinguistic conceptualisation of the conversational situation, there can be no doubt
that it has one, for even non-linguistic animals have that much. There can
therefore be no doubt that this cognitive apparatus, for reasons which have
nothing to do with language as such, partitions the world into functionally
relevant "natural kinds" of the kind investigated by Landau in this volume,
individual entities, including events, propositions, and such grammatically
relevant notions as actual and potential participants and properties of those
events, as well as the attitudes and attentional focus of other conversational
participants. Since the main thing that syntax is for is for passing concepts
around, the belief that syntactic structure keeps as close as possible t o semantics, and that in both evolutionary and child language acquisition terms, the
early development of syntax amounts to little more than hanging words onto
the preexisting armatures of conceptua.1 structure is so simple and probable
as to amount to the null hypothesis.4

Of course, as Chomsky has repeatedly pointed out, this realisation gets
us practically nowhere. We have such a poor grasp of the nature of the
putative underlying conceptual structures that it is extremely difficult to
even design experimental tests of it, (quite ampartfrom the other difficulties
that arise in doing experiments with prelinguistic children) .5 Gleitman and
others in the present volume have made considerable headway in the face of
these difficulties, but there is a long way to go. For similar reasons to do
with limitations on current knowledge, it does not seem to constrain syntactic
theory in any very useful way. Right now, (and this is Chomsky's substantive
point), the most reliable entry to the human system of language and symbolic
cognition that we have comes from the linguists' phenomenological grasp of
a review of some proposed mechanisms, including the important computational work of
Anderson 1977, and see Gleitman 1990 for some cogent warnings against the assumption
that such semantic representations have their origin solely in present perception and the
material world in any simple sense of that term.
4The use of the words "little more" rather than "nothing more" is important. I t would
not be surprising to find that some part of syntax - perhaps the observed constraints
upon consistent orders across heads and complements - had its origin elsewhere than in
semantics.
5I a m not saying that logicians and my fellow computer scientists do not have interesting formalisms for representing conceptual structures. In fact these systems are the
sole source of formal theoretical devices tha.t linguists have t o draw on. But as knowledge
representation systems, none of them as yet seem particularly close to the human one.

the syntactic epiphenomenon, which has only just begun to look as though
it is yielding some insight into the underlying conceptual structure.
Nevertheless, the claim that semantics is the precursor of syntax is not
without content, and has consequences for the question at hand. In particular, it immediately entails that if we are asking ourselves why children do not
classify meet as subcategorising for NP P P on the basis of sentences like l b ,
we met Harry on the bus, then we are simply asking the wrong question. A
child who learns this instance of this verb from this sentence must start from
the knowledge that the denoted event is a meeting, and that this involves a
transitive event concept. It simply never crosses the childs mind that meet
might subcategorise like put, because the conceptual representation doesn't
suggest that.
Once again, taking this position raises more questions than it answers. We
are only just beginning to make sense of the complex ma.pping between surface grammatical roles like subject and object, and the underlying thematic
roles that seem t o be characteristic of the conceptual level (I am particularly
thinking of recent work by Grimshaw 1990.) It also raises the question of
whether the child's conceptual representation really can be used reliably in
this fashion, which Pinker 1989 has called "semantic bootstrapping", and, if
not, how the child can cope with its unreliability.

$4 SYNTACTIC
A N D SEMANTIC
"BOOTSTRAPPING"
Gleitman 1990 argues very persuasively that the child must often find itself
in a situation which is ambiguous with respective to the conceptual representation. To take one of her examples, a child who is being read a story
from their picture-book about a fox and a rabbit may have insufficient information from their understanding of the story and from a picture of the
fox running after the rabbit to tell whether an unknown verb in an adult
sentence of the form "The fox is VERBing the rabbit" should be associated
with the concept of cha,sing, or the concept of fleeing. In a number of elegant
experiments, she and Landau and their colleagues have shown that children
who are artificially placed in this situation identify whichever conceptual representation is consistent with the syntactic form of the sentence. Since this
is the only information that appears to be available to the children as a basis
for the decision, they argue that children are capable of using a process of

"syntactic bootstrapping" to aid them in learning the subcategorisations of
verbs. Such a process requires the child to generalise from its existing partial
knowledge of syntax and verbal subcategorisations, perhaps via the "linking
rules" discussed by Pinker and his coleagues (cf. Gropen et a1 1991).
Gleitman's proposal is in principle entirely consistent with semantic bootstrapping in the sense outlined here. It is actually quite likely that the child's
conceptual representation isn't much more underspecified than being ambiguous as to whether this situation is an instance of transitive chasing or
transitive fleeing, and a few other equally relevant propositions. That is, we
can probably assume that the child knows what it is to be "read a story" that
the story is "about the fox trying to ea.t the rabbit", aad a lot of relevant
facts such as that "to eat something you ha,ve to ca,tch it", "rabbits don't like
being eaten", and so on. (If they don't know stuff like this, then they may
be in a position to learn the nouns, but probably not to learn the verbs.) In
this case, there aren't likely to be tha.t ma.ny other possibilities, and syntactic bootstrapping may well reduce the set to one possible meaning. If so, it
may well do so in the fa.ce of syntactic complications that are irrelevant to
subcategorisations, such as the presence of modifiers or adjuncts. Their presence will not lead the child to include them in crazy subcategorisations that
will stop it from acquiring the right meaning. It already has an appropriate
meaning, as one of a number of alternatives tha.t syntactic bootstrapping
correctly disambiguates.
One piece of circumstantial evidence in support of this conjecture is that
that adults work this way too. There is increasing experimental evidence
that the adult sentence processing mechanism deals with the huge degree of
nondeterminism that arises from na.tural grammars by a.ppealing t o meaning,
filtering out the miriad spurious paths that the grammar permits on the basis
of whether they make sense, both on the basis of sentence-internal semantics,
and of reference and extension in the context. This semantic filtering of spurious paths which would otherwise overwhelm the computational resources
of the processor has been claimed to go on continually at every point in the
parsing process, with very fine "grain", proba.bly more or less word by word.
(See Steedman & Altmann 1989 and Clifton & Ferreira 1989 for references
and arguments pro and contra this proposal, which ultimately comes from
computer science, particularly in work by Winograd 1972.)

Nevertheless, it may well be the case, as Gleitman suggests, that children
are frequently much more at sea than this, a.nd may even have much larger
sets of propositions in mind, of which most or even all of which are irrelevant
t o the adult meaning. However, recent computational work by Siskind (1992,
and this volume) shows that a process of intersecting such sets on successive
encounters with the verb can be used to eliminate the spurious meaning^.^
Of course, children are not adults, and neither are they mind readers,
and a meaning that seems "appropriate" to them over a number of iterations
of this process may not be the same as the adult's. The child's concept of
"chasing" (we may imagine as an extension of Gleitman7sexample) may be
overspecifically restricted to an activity of attempting to catch by running. In
this case, their own future use may be characterised by "undergeneralisation"
- for example, they may be by unwillingness to agree that a similar scenario
involving cars is chasing. There is of course a huge literature that has revealed
the fine detail of this process.7 There are also instances of overgeneralisation,
and possibly even more bizarre "complexes", revealed in non-standard lexical
meanings. There is also evidence that children predict new lexical entries
that they have not actually encountered, via. lexical rules such as the rule
that generates causative verbs from certa.in a.djectives, such as cool. This
process may on occasion give rise to non-standard lexical causatives, as in
#It colds my hand, either because of slightly non-standard lexical rules, or
because standard rules are applied to slightly non-standard lexical entries.
(See Bowerman 1982 and references therein.)
The way in which children successively modify non-standard lexical items
to approximate the adult lexicon is the most challenging and least wellunderstood part of the process. But the undoubted fact that the processes
of syntactic and semantic bootstrapping appea,r to iterate in this way suggests
that together they may constitute the process by which children gain access
'Two problems which Siskind leaves open are the problem of polysemous verbs, and
the problem that arises when t,he set of putative meanings derived from an occurence of
the verb are all spurious. Both of these eventualities will lead t o empty intersections.
One simple tactic that might serve to distinguish them and thereby be used t o maintain
a coherent lexicon would be t o respond to an empty intersection by keeping both entries,
relying on a tactic like binomial error estimation to distinguish between true polysemous
lexical entries and spurious ones on distributional grounds.
'For example, Brown 1973, Bowerman 1973 and Clark 1973, and Carey 1982, the last
including an extensive review.

to concepts which are not immediately available to pre-linguistic sensorymotor cognition, and may thereby provide the force behind the explosive
change in cognitive abilities that coincides, both in evolutionary and in
Computachild-developmental terms, with the appearance of l a n g ~ a g e . ~
tional models of the kind proposed by Brent and Siskind will continue to
provide the only way in which theories of this process, such as syntactic,
prosodic and semantic "bootstrapping", can be developed and evaluated.

'See Vygotsky 1962 for for some early speculations on the nature of this process and
its relation to Piagetian sensory-motor development, and see Oliron 1953 and Furth 1961
for some suggestive early studies of the effects of deprivation.
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